POLIZIANO AND PHILOSOPHY THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN NOTION OF THE HUMANITIES? AMOS EDELHEIT

This article is focused on Angelo Poliziano's general attitude to philosophy as a discipline and on his specific accounts of scholastic philosophy, found mainly in his four opening lectures to his courses on Aristotle's logic and ethics that were held in the Florentine Studium between 1490 and 1494, in the that philosophy was more important to Poliziano than common expressions -tant definition of history presented in his Panepistemon, together with other pieces of evidence, can reveal the moment in which disciplines associated with from the natural sciences -at a point just preceding the massive critique of Aristotelian science during the sixteenth century -through Poliziano's notion
Some longstanding scholarly views concerning Renaissance humanism issue of the starting point of the humanist movement and fashion in Italy (around the middle of the thirteenth century, instead of the accepted view discipline for this starting point (grammar instead of rhetoric), is one obvi 1 Another case is that of the formerly prevalent views of the relations between Renaissance humanism and the humanists on the one hand and philosophy on the other. In this case too, as we shall shortly see, more adequate scholarly accounts were needed in In this article I shall further investigate the relations between human ists and philosophy in general, and more specifically scholastic philoso 1 (Cambridge, 2012) . But see the review
Ronald G. Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni The Two Latin Cultures and the Foundation of Renaissance Humanism in Medieval Italy
The Times Literary Supplement theological matters and the role of religion in the Italian Renaissance.
COPYRIGHT TRADITIO VOLUME Ethics will be different from previous methods of division, since he will include in the discussion not only disciplines (disciplinae) and arts (artes), both liberal (liberales) and mechanical (machinales), but also base (sordidae sellulariae) arts. The reason for this is that these arts are also needed in life, and they are therefore to be included in this new division, a reflection of the whole of human knowledge, offered here by Poliziano. 7 In doing so, Poliziano is telling us, he is following two professional groups (sectiones doctors who specialized in anatomy and mathematicians who are mak ing calculations by using special boards. The principle behind it is that through this practice of dividing individual matters into smaller parts and then restoring them to their wholeness, every part in them could either be more easily perceived or remembered in a more trustworthy manner. It can be said that Poliziano is describing here something simi logues such as the Sophist or Statesman.
Poliziano is not worried by the thought that this is a difficult task that so far has not been proposed and performed by anyone, facts that can provide an opportunity for his detractors to criticize and attack him. 
Poliziano. But in the Panepistemon
ties that goes beyond the standard, albeit implicit, manner in which new ideas and theories are introduced in scholastic discourses. According to Poliziano, the common or wonted (usitata) practices (probably the man ners of classifying sciences and disciplines by the scholastics) are, on the exculcata nimis) and practically worth less (sordent), while he, on the other hand, has learned not to follow in the footsteps of others, since in matters of importance his own will is as the most worthless among human beings (probably referring to the famous critique of poets found in the Republic), and he was followed by Horace who called such men servile cattle (servum pecus).
11 His scholas tic rivals, Poliziano complains, will look for every opportunity (occasio), for no good reason at all, to attack him. 12 What is it that seems to be bothering them? According to Poliziano, his own use of Greek words in his discussion of the arts while his rivals hardly know Latin is one rea arts and disciplines are so obvious that it is enough to point them out show favor toward one who offers them great utility emerging from a the delight that comes from an erudite and somewhat new variety of different concepts. Greater utility and delight will be the outcome of this new method of dividing arts and disciplines offered by Poliziano to replace the common and much too habitual methods. And here comes a orations of words, nor cosmetics of colorful language. ment that we usually find in the beginning of a scholastic account, in many cases addressing a humanist audience, is indeed surprising.
15 This statement is immediately followed by the first division, and so, at this point, we move from the opening section to the actual presentation of the new division of the arts and disciplines.
Poliziano begins by saying that there are three kinds of doctrines to the first, philosophy as the mother of arts to the second, and divi nation to the third. the intellect (intellectione distractae). These things are either substances or accidents. These accidents are yet again divided into accidents through being a multitude and accidents through being a magnitude. Multitude and changing. pedigree (stemma naturale), are born first philosophy, which investigates the soul, and four mathematical disciplines (the traditional quadrivium arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. These disciplines are fol lowed by yet other disciplines.
mores) on individual, family, and city or community levels. This triple offspring conducts the administration of moral and civil matters.
20 By rational phi trivium. Here we find logic, dialectic, rhetoric, poetry, grammar, and history. 21 following section of the Panepistemon, which is dedicated to a detailed account of each part of philosophy. Natural philosophy clearly belongs to the speculative part. It focuses on matters that generally are pres ent in (material) things (communiter insunt rebus), such as (material) principles and things related to them or proceeding from them, or on matters that only seem to be present but in fact are not, like vacuum (inane) and infinity (infinitum).
22 It is rather difficult to understand Given the institutional affinity in the Italian universities between nat ural philosophy and medicine, and the fact that natural philosophy was mainly taught in medical faculties, it is not surprising that Poliziano regards medicine as the pupil (alumna) of natural philosophy and thus pro vides a rather detailed and technical account of the medical disciplines.
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Focusing on first philosophy, Poliziano argues that it investigates God, minds (mentes) that are separated from the body, and also many prin De natura hominis. This strategy reflects well the humanist approach and its philosophical preferences.
The significant difference between the triple division of the soul pre sented by Poliziano, which can be regarded as Aristotelian, and the one of Nemesius, lies in the fact that, beyond the change in terminology for each of the three faculties (animalis, vitalis, naturalis), we find all the intellectual and sensual abilities in the first faculty, while the other two contain only the physical aspects of a living human being. This struc ture, which sharply distinguishes the intellectual and sensible level from the corporeal level, is obviously more compatible with the Christian doc trine of the immortality of the soul than the Aristotelian division, where the intellectual abilities are completely dependent on the function of the imagination and of the senses, which are connected to corporeal organs Following short accounts of other disciplines included in first philoso phy, such as arithmetic, music, astrology, and optics, with an important section dedicated to mechanics, Poliziano moves on to the second part of philosophy, the moral part, which is part of politics (civilitas), and in which different good matters (bona) are treated. Among these Poliziano mentions virtue both of the rational soul and of a soul that obeys and follows reason.
Therefore, the affections, potencies, and habits of the soul are investi Once again we see that the will is attached to the appetite, and here ing description of the will even by Thomistic standards.
fortitudo), equanimity (aequanimitas), continence (continentia), temperance (temperantia), kindness (liberalitas), greatness of soul (magnitudo animi), eminence (magnificentia), integrity (honestas), grav ity (gravitas), refinement (urbanitas), truthfulness (veritas), righteous ness (iustitia scientia), prudence (prudentia), intelligence (intellegentia), appraisement (aestimatio), shrewdness (solertia), sagacity (sagacitas), friendliness (comitas), heroic virtue (heroica virtus ment (voluptas), prosperity (prosperitas), friendship (amicitia), benevo lence (benevolentia), concord (concordia), and love (amor). It would be interesting to find out where Poliziano got this multiple list of virtues, invention. This catalogue of virtues is immediately followed by a swift move to that part of moral philosophy that is related to management (dispensativa pars) in general and to politics (civilis pars) in particular, After discussing other celebrated arts (artes celebratae) like agriculture, pasturing, hunting, architecture, painting, cooking, and some arts related to the theater (actors, gladiators, gymnasts, and charioteers), Poliziano continues in the same vein and mentions briefly nomenclature and its parts, and then many other professions. Upon reading this long and detailed list of almost any possible art and discipline, including some worthless artists (nugatorii artifices), one might think that this is some kind of a parody on the notion of practicality and on such detailed discus sions with endless divisions and subdivisions. This list ends the account of practical philosophy, and Poliziano, after an interesting remark that yet reinforces the impression that this last section in the Panepistemon, ately moves on to discuss grammar, which is, as we have seen, already part of rational philosophy. this discipline.
history [is divided into a part that aims at causing] pleasure, as in the plots used by comic poets, [and another part that aims at] encourage the Aesopian fables, or on the solidity of truth, which is put together either by means of shameful matters in the case of some poetic fables, or concealed in pious veil, which is the only genre the ancient philosophers accepted. Trustworthy history deals with places, as geography, or with epochs, as chronicles, or with the nature of animals [and] plants, or with public affairs, like annals, and other histories, of which the components when it represents speeches made in public gatherings. In this description of history, the second part of rational philosophy, we see a most unusual group of arts and disciplines put together. It is begin, history is not understood by Poliziano either in the ancient or in the modern sense of this term. And it is definitely not the way most con temporary humanist intellectuals in the fifteenth century had used this word. History, according to Poliziano, is a narrative description used in different forms of writing, either literary (fabulous) or what we can call scientific (trustworthy). Interestingly, some literary forms are based on This point is crucial, since Poliziano is clearly developing a new notion This notion stands in sharp contrast to contemporary institutional divi zi ano and his initiative to teach Aristotle in the University of Florence.
According to Poliziano, scientific history includes such fields as geo analysis. The other parts of rational philosophy are dialectic, rhetoric, and detail, and since the main theme of the present study is Poliziano and philosophy, let us turn our attention to dialectic. According to Poliziano, the Latin term dialectica was first presented by Varro, who divided this normae de loquendo), on grammatical terms and parts of speech and sentences (de eloquendo), on proposition (de proloquendo, the Stoic axioma), on different kinds of propositions (de proloquiorum summa de iudicando), and on these matters that should be presented in speech (de his quae dicenda sunt). This basic division busdam poeticis figmentis, aut pio tegitur velamine, quod solum genus philosophi veteres admiserunt. Ad fidem historia de locis est, ut geographia, vel de temporibus ut chronice, vel de natura ut animalium, plantarum, vel de gestis rebus ut annales, instrumentum, materia, res. Stilus in historia fusus et continuus, non perihodicus, Poliziano, Omnia opera proloquendo, de proloquiorum summa, de iudicando, de his quae dicenda sunt quae The first meaning of dialectic, which never searches anything beyond rems. 51 The second meaning of dialectic does not deal with words (literae) but rather with the truth (veritas) and with the cognitive movements of the soul (animi cogniti motus the filth of matter (materiae sordes reformidans), allowing logic to occupy itself with these material things. 52 others as an instrument, or, like Boethius, as both.
The Platonic dialectic, Poliziano contends, may appear to some to be very different and perhaps also more difficult. And indeed, Poliziano mentions some early episodes in his life when he was involved in scholastic disputations, pointing out that he was praised for his performances. He also describes some philosophical books that he interpreted either publicly or privately for some students.
do we need words when we are evaluated by our actions, he asks. Fol lowing Epictetus, he presents an analogy between sheep, which do not brag about the large amount of grass they have eaten but rather offer their shepherd their milk and wool, and the philosopher, who ought not to make long speeches about the efforts he has invested in his studies but rather offer us the fruits of his learning. Poliziano makes it very clear that this is what he believes that he, too, should do (quod et nobis erit, opinor, faciendum philosopher than words and declarations (interestingly, this is also the preference and criterion for good preachers in medieval culture, and so we have here yet another analogy between the preacher or the theolo gian, and the philosopher). The question, as far as Poliziano is concerned, is only about the quality of these doctrines, and even here one has to be Therefore, lend me your ears and minds, Florentine youth, to draw with me the elements of true philosophy, not from the muddy cisterns of the barbarians, but from the perspicuous fountains of the Greeks and Romans. We should also take care and avoid a situation where we draw anything from this source that we would not be able to defend with rea son or authority. In his final words, Poliziano declares that, in the case of this short lecture, it is not true that the sharpness of the mind will be blunted by tions, thanks to its evident shortness and its free style of discussion.
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Not all doubts and concerns will be either raised and discussed or dis vestra ingenia) in the most comfortable manner, and not to cause you fatigue. So this short account of dialectic is already itself a kind of a dialectical
In the Lamia, Poliziano developed further a model for the historian of philosophy very different from the models held by contemporary scho lastic philosophers. In many respects the Florentine intellectual scene of 66 Humanism, according to Kristeller, was an important cultural movement, but it was focused on a very specific part of culture, basically the linguistic disciplines. ing precedence to the ancient Greek and Roman sources over everything else, and in fact dismissing any other source. The image of the lamia that he uses to describe his scholastic opponents (probably some scholas Studio Fiorentino or any other scholas tic philosophers, teachers in the private studia of the different religious orders, etc.) 70 is that of bloodthirsty creatures with removable eyes (oculi exemptiles) who put their eyes on like eyeglasses when they are walking outside, putting them away and becoming blind while being at home. This limited, manipulative, and rather inconsistent use of the eyes and of the sense of seeing is clearly the way, according to Poliziano, scholas tic philosophers are using their eyes, i.e., their minds, while discussing philosophizing. The analogy between the eyes and the mind, seeing and thinking, a standard analogy in the philosophical tradition known at least since the Platonic dialogues and revived, like so many other classical analogies and themes, during the fifteenth century, becomes evident in a very signifi cant passage in the Lamia Since if it is not permissible to philosophize, it is not permissible to live the eyes. Therefore, the one who does not want to live well should not philosophize. The one who wants to live dishonorably should not pursue philosophy.
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Apology
and to Aris Metaphysics arguments by Poliziano come at the beginning of his response to several critiques of philosophy that were presented earlier, and they are part that philosophizing is strongly related to living in accordance with the emphasizes the importance of dialectic as the necessary art of distinguish ing the true from the false, while dismissing rhetoric and regarding it as meddlesome vanity, an art that is focused on pretending and deceiving instead of pursuing the truth. On the same lines, philosophy does not approaches (122).
72 Poliziano, Lamia virtutem vivendum non est. At sicut animo vivimus, ita animi virtute bene vivimus, quemadmodum sicuti oculis videmus, ita oculorum virtute bene videmus. Qui bene dignoscitur, qua mendacium refutatur, sicuti e diverso, esse occupatissimam vani tatem quae artificium hoc non sequitur sed simulat, verumque colorem fuco menti have to do anything, only devote itself to contemplation. What we seem to have here is a very Aristotelian perspective on philosophy, identify civic and political issues. The truth of the matter is that once the histori cal and philological methods have come to be used in philosophy, every tiny becomes part of philosophical discourse. This was possible thanks to Panepistemon izing philosophical prose and treating it as part of ancient literature in the broad sense.
Poliziano continues with this Aristotelian line of argumentation, com pletely understandable in an introductory lecture for a course on the Prior Analytics, relating philosophy to happiness (felicitas) and assigning to philosophy the role of curing the soul. 75 He seems truly committed to philosophy in a way that is beyond mere stylistic and philological concerns. 76 The fact that Poliziano does not wish to be called a philos but should rather suggest a completely different approach to philosophy from the one used by most scholastic philosophers. In other words, Poliz iano cannot be regarded (by himself or others) as a philosopher simply because this title was commonly identical at that time to that of scholas This is clearly one of the early accounts of the importance of the place philosophers and interpreters. The remark in the last sentence is directed against the arrogance of scholastic philosophers who are unaware that not yet turn them into Aristotles. Moreover, the use of scholastic methods will probably make many of them bad interpreters.
part of his new scholarly approach to philosophy. This new approach also implies regarding philosophy as an end in itself and not as an instru ment for making profit or gaining anything, as well as realizing that phi reaches its full growth even without any price required. And how many ingenious people are there whose prayers would not include the wish for a free time to philosophize? But this indeed would not happen if to phi losophize would be regarded more as a task than as a pleasure. How come that we can practice this study and always meditate without the need for any instruments from outside, that there is no place unsuitable for it? For wherever you are the truth is at hand.
Poliziano is describing here the notion of philosophical freedom, or the freedom to pursue the truth everywhere and without any pragmatic or studia and the universities.
Aristotelis profiteor interpretem. Quam idoneum non attinet dicere, sed certe inter pretem profiteor, philosophum non profiteor. Nec enim si regis quoque essem inter cited and discussed in Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo
On this issue see the important but inconclusive remarks in Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo
Translation of the Enchiridion Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
Poliziano, Lamia mum incrementum brevi pervenit philosophia nulla etiam proposita mercede. Et quotus est ingeniosorum cui non otium sit in votis ut philosophari liceat? Hoc autem profecto non fieret, si philosophari labor ac non potius voluptas esset. Quid quod geat instrumentis, ut cui nullus incongruens sit locus? Ubi ubi enim fueris, praesto labor COPYRIGHT TRADITIO VOLUME assigning to philosophy what is traditionally assigned to theology. This is a dramatic change from the medieval institutional status of philosophy, which was regarded as an important and crucial ingredient taught in the arts or medical faculties as a preparation for a career in the three higher Poliziano continues along this line, and it carries him far beyond Aris totelian logic and much closer to the territory of standard theological but, instead of some biblical, patristic, or scholastic authorities, he cites Pindar on the one hand, and an ancient popular proverb on the other. A serious consideration of human life, glory, and physical beauty will force us, according to Poliziano, to conclude that there is nothing solid and last ing in human affairs.
The only thing in human affairs that is worthy (dignum) of pursuit and attention is, accord ing to Poliziano (who is citing here Horace and following Iamblichus), our anima to animus, and the focus on the divine spark in us rather than on the human soul. Describing this particle of the divine breath as governing or directing all human life (aura), has a clear Stoic flavor. and his historical sensitivities stand behind his description of the philoso pher (in which he is following Plato and Seneca) as someone who is very critical (and thus radical from a social and political point of view) with for a complete distinction between kings and slaves. This remark should discourse, which is one of the most intriguing features of the political discourse in Florence (but usually not associated with Poliziano), at least since the days of Salutati by the end of the fourteenth century.
see Lamia
In Stoic sources animus is a translation of logos Stoi-, collegit Ionnes ab Arnim, Volumen IV, quo indices con logos emerges from the hegemonikon but is not equal to it. In animus is a spark of the divine pneuma = hegemonikon. One need not assume that Poliziano was fully aware of all these Stoic connections.
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes
The umbratilis sapientia) that is described of the cave. Those fettered in the darkness of the cave are the mob (vulgus) and the unlearned (ineruditi), while the philosopher is free from chains in the shining light (clara in luce). It is here that we find Poliz allowed.
Renaissance Quarterly eadem dignitate et civilitatis honore esse voluistis, dum novae peregrinaeque vir tuti aditum ad honores in vobis non precluditis speratisque et alienum et e plebe hominem posse inter vos fieri in curia sapientem, in foro facundum, domi utilem, foris honestum, bello paceque bonum civem, nec (quod fere ubique fit) nobilitati tantum sed virtuti honorum titulos et praemia decernitis, dum acerbissimarum igna vae nobilitatis legum vinculis solutos cives vestros esse voluistis licereque omnibus iniurias nihil obesse, et, ne longiores simus, dum licet in consortio et societate reipu blicae esse et, quod aequae libertatis est, sortito et invicem annuis magistratibus parere atque imperitare, eo incrementi et gloriae res vestra perducta est ut rerum gestarum gloriae imperium accesserit et gloriam studiumque eius tanta imperii mer arly accounts of these issues with further references, see, e.g., Hans Baron, his arrogant behavior and for practically being a charlatan who in the last three years has been teaching things that he does not really know and understand, things that he is not competent to teach. Against this accusation, Poliziano declares that he is only an interpreter of philosoph the names of interpreters of poets who were not themselves poets. By doing that, Poliziano is pointing out the significance of interpretative scholarship, which, since antiquity and all throughout the Middle Ages, has had its place beside the works of philosophy or poetry. Moreover, Poliziano is presenting a part of the philosophical tradition as a tradi tion of philological interpretation, and by doing so he brings it closer to philology. He creates a space for philological interpretations that are not restricted to specific disciplines but rather are being used as instruments in different disciplines. These instruments of the philologists are valid and useful for any kind of writings (omne scriptorum genus torical, rhetorical, philosophical, medical, and legal. From a contempo ciation of the philologists, in comparison to their status in antiquity. mar teachers who were called grammatici. Poliziano is aiming at estab lishing a distinction (which he supports by using the authority of the ancient Greeks and Romans while closely following Suetonius) between this group of elementary teachers (who in fact should be called grammatistae or literatores) on the one hand, and the professional men of letters, the learned (who in fact are the ones who should be called grammatici or litterati).
Thus, the only title that Poliziano is asking for himself is that of a philologist, a grammaticus in the true and ancient sense of this term. But this still entails knowing many things regarding many different dis ciplines, without which the philologist will not be able to correct and meleon, which changes its colors to suit the different surfaces, must learn 100 One can have the proper schol arly and theoretical background without the more technical, formal, and practical aspects of a discipline. This might be the turning point that later led to the creation of the sharp distiction between the humani teachers in philosophy (that is, that he does not have any formal philo sophical education), nor has he ever seemed to be reading philosophical books, 101 Poliziano mentions his friendly relations with the most learned philosophers on the one hand, and his trunks full of books of the ancient essent et iudices scriptorum omnium soli grammatici, quos ob id etiam criticos voca Lamia Lamia important account of a change in the usage of the term grammaticus in Poliziano. 100 quis iurisconsultum me salutet aut medicum, non me ab eo derideri prorsus credam? Commentarios tamen iamdiu (quod sine arrogantia dictum videri velim) simul in ius ipsum civile, simul in medicinae auctores parturio et quidem multis vigiliis, nec aliud Lamia, ed.
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COPYRIGHT TRADITIO VOLUME Greek commentators on Aristotle, on the other. 102 As we have already seen in the Praelectio de dialectica, this corpus of the ancient Greek com competence in philosophy in general. Such competence was probably not enough to turn him into a philosopher in the eyes of some scholastic philosophers, but nevertheless it is a valuable competence thanks to which Poliziano could correct, comment on, and translate some ancient the university.
cal traces in his writings, and if they will find such traces, they will be forced to admit that he has learned at least something from some teach ers.
105 This statement, once again, indicates how important philosophy this he now turns his attention to the two books of the Prior Analytics, books that, on the one hand, are enveloped in plenty of philosophical iano approaches these rules more willingly, eagerly, and spiritedly, 107 and therefore emphasizes the importance of the Prior Analytics [These books] are almost disregarded in all the schools by our contem porary philosophers, not because they are less useful, but rather because leave to others the name of a philosopher?
We have here an important account of what was going on inside other courses on the Aristotelian corpus in the Florentine Studium and prob ably also in other studia, where, according to Poliziano, this important obvious implication is that most of the teachers in those studia were incompetent and could not deal properly with these difficulties. As we on the Prior Analytics Poliziano chooses to end the Lamia with a story in which a sharp contrast is once again drawn between contemporary and ancient philoso phers.
110 Apparently the birds once upon a time (olim) neglected good advice given them by the owl. Realizing that it was good advice and recognizing their mistake on the one hand and the wisdom of that owl on the other, they now (nunc) regard the owl with enormous respect, since now they want to learn something from it. But all these efforts are useless (frustra), Poliziano contends, since only those ancient owls 107 Ibid. parum utiles, sed quia nimis scrupulosi, praetereuntur. Quis mihi igitur iure succen seat, si laborem hunc interpretandi difficillima quaeque sumpsero, nomen vero aliis the present situation is that there are many owls around that only have doing philosophy is through philological and historical methods, thanks to which we create a bridge to the ancient wisdom, the only authentic cealing the truth. Ancient wisdom is lost, and contemporary pretensions to present wisdom in philosophical discussions are useless and based on false assumptions.
Let us now discuss the fourth and last opening lecture that we have by Dialectica 111 different fundamental concepts and theories but rather a collection of the basic notions in logic presented in a unique way of connecting them. While discussing the most truthful principles of argumentation (argumentandi verissima percepta), that is, the principles of Aristotelian logic, wishing to bring together into one account the many different compo nents of logic, 112 admits, in the section dedicated to the presentation of On Interpretation made by the dialectician but rather many starting points to a dialectical the many from the one (deduction), since this investigation does not fol low one response.
Poliziano follows Aristotle and presents the rules regarding demonstra tion (praecepta de demonstratione tive or negative, and they can be either universal or particular, or else indefinite. There is a demonstrative proposition and there is a dialecti cal proposition. The dialectical deals with contradictions, and through a process of investigation one should choose the probable option, which is then resolved by this proposition. We can find here an interesting account of universals, where Poliz iano seems to present a realist point of view, regarding universals as first sented in what is known by itself (per se either by essence (essentia) or by its own peculiar characteristic (proprio) but also in a universal manner (universaliter). A universal (universale) is defined as something that is about everything and is the first cause or 115 Interesingly, Poliziano creates a conceptual relation principium), universal (universale), and form or idea (idea), all of which are beyond demonstration.
We should not, according to Poliziano, make a distinction between a universal and that which is about everything. Truth and necessity are necessary arguments but also through their own concepts like the one or related genus, and then, through universals, because they are not made out of corruptible things. But there is no science that can watch over dom. (axiomata) and faculties (facultates). Poliziano presents a clear and rather negation, correct demonstration to the one that is derived from impos sible circumstance. Here, again, we find the term faculty ulty is that which teaches us about a cause of something else, that which is focused on the intelligible and the universal, and finally that which has simpler principles. 120 We further find some more standard but nevertheless important dis are different principles, so there are different sciences, and the same issue can be demonstrated by various means. There is no science of the acci are no similar unique principles nor common principles, and opinion on the one hand and knowledge or science on the other differ both in their 121 Just before leaving the discussion of On Interpretation and moving on, in the last section of the Dialectica, to present each of the books of Aris
Topics, Poliziano provides an interesting account of a compromise
At last we have in the midst of our soul the seed of an absent proposi tion, when that universal that is the one beyond the many is produced by the senses, imagination, memory, intellect, forms, and some concepts. The universal seems here to be, on the one hand, an abstraction cre ated by human faculties, but nevertheless, on the other hand, it seems seed inside our soul.
In the Topics dialectic is mainly treated here as reasoning from probable arguments (ratiocinatio ex probabilibus), differently from forensic dialectic, since in forensic dialectic things are presented as probable that only seem to be probable. Poliziano then enumerates the four instruments of the dia finding out distinctions, and considering similarity.
Poliziano ends this account by pointing out the importance of Aris in the case of a debate, for attacking or defending positions, since this whole art is about reasoning, demonstrations, distinctions, and cavils. academic disciplinary divisions on an institutional level on the one hand, and offers the possibility of a separation (which indeed happened much later) between natural sciences and the humanities on the other hand. In his discussion of rhetoric and dialectic, Poliziano turns to Mar
De nuptiis as a main source, a fact that shows that our humanist was not, after all, that allergic to works that served as medi
In the Praelectio de dialectica we have found an important account of tinus, Poliziano is implicitly pointing out two different meanings of dia relations between liberal arts and philosophy, where apparently the lib eral arts prepare the ground for the study of philosophy.
The important definition of history that was presented in the Panepistemon receives an interesting echo in the Lamia, where Poliziano establishes the position of the historian and interpreter of philosophy as against that advocated by contemporary scholastic philosophers. students what he regarded as the proper manner of philosophizing. But the new philological and historical methods as applied to philosophi which we have already noticed in the Panepistemon the separation and distinction between the natural sciences, which are going to become more practical and technical, and the humanities, which are going to provide the historical dimension and critical reflec tion about natural and other sciences. It might come as a surprise to and his defense of the concept of philosophical truth, following some Dialectica we have noticed his attitude toward the tension between the realists and the looking for a compromise between these two different positions. We have also found here a general appreciation of logic as a discipline, as strongly connected to necessity and truth, and thus as much more than a mere instrument. Poliziano discusses here the relations between first causes, faculties that are crucial for any kind of knowledge or science. In light of all this evidence, it is clear that the relations between Renaissance humanists like Poliziano and philosophy as a discipline, and even more so Renaissance Aristotelianisms and scholasticisms, should attempted to show, it is among Renaissance humanists and scholastics that we can find the first steps toward the modern separation between the natural sciences and the humanities.
